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In May of this year Paul Hallwood and Ronnie MacDonald 
(H&M) published a paper under the auspices of the Policy 
Institute in which they argue the case for fiscal autonomy in 
Scotland with or without independence (Hallwood and 
MacDonald, 2006). They conclude that fiscal autonomy is 
to be preferred because it 
 
“ …offers a much sharper and clearer incentive 
mechanism – for both the private sector and the elected 
representatives in Edinburgh – than the current Barnett 
financial arrangement and also relative to other lesser 
forms of fiscal devolution, such as fiscal federalism” (page 
31). 
 
The authors claim empirical support for their view that the 
incentive generating effects of fiscal autonomy will result in 
more efficient resource allocation and faster economic 
growth in Scotland. Moreover, they contend that the size of 
this return will be more than sufficient to outweigh the risks 
inherent in fiscal autonomy. They argue that such risks 
include the loss of the block grant from Westminster of a 
certain and known amount, and no bail out from London in 
the event of a tax shortfall. 
 
We welcome Hallwood and MacDonald‟s further 
contribution to the debate on financing devolved Scotland. 
The most recent paper adds to their earlier distinguished 
work published in the Allander Series, where they argued 
in favour of a fiscal federalist solution to the financing of 
Scotland‟s public sector (Hallwood and MacDonald, 2004; 
2005). However, we contend that H&M fail to establish a 
case for fiscal autonomy in Scotland, and that the 
arguments deployed in their previous work in favour of a 
form of fiscal federalism in Scotland do not, as they 
suggest, have even greater force in the case for fiscal 
autonomy within the Union. Moreover, we go further and 
argue that in adopting fiscal autonomy Scotland would lose 
many of the benefits of economic and fiscal integration with 
the rest of the UK for little or no gain compared with a form 
of fiscal federalism or even the present Barnett based 
system of financing Scottish devolution. 
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The remainder of this paper is in four parts. We first assess 
some of the arguments typically used to justify greater 
fiscal responsibility at the sub-central government (SCG) 
level and highlight the principal differences between fiscal 
federalism/decentralisation and full fiscal autonomy. 
Secondly, we compare fiscal autonomy with the present 
Barnett-based system of funding the Scottish parliament 
using a standard set of criteria. Our view is that H&M either 
misunderstand or misrepresent the present funding 
system, which has many of the efficiency characteristics 
that they seem to uniquely associate with fiscal autonomy. 
The next section identifies a set of largely political and 
administrative problems associated with fiscal autonomy 
that are little considered in H&M‟s latest work. Finally, the 
paper concludes by reiterating the reasons why fiscal 
autonomy is not to be preferred either to the present 
Barnett system or to a form of fiscal federalism. We also 
note that some of the claimed advantages of fiscal 
federalism may not be as robust as asserted by its 
proponents and that further research is advisable before 
serious consideration is given to the adoption of new 
funding arrangements for Scotland. 
 
2. Fiscal autonomy and fiscal federalism 
Under fiscal autonomy the Scottish parliament would be 
wholly responsible for raising, and spending its tax 
revenues. Part of these revenues, an amount agreed to 
cover Scotland‟s share of centrally provided public goods 
such as defence, and foreign affairs would go to 
Westminster. The rest would be retained in Scotland. 
There would be no subvention from the rest of the UK to 
ensure that levels of provision of public and merit goods 
met a UK standard. Therefore, apart from the central 
provision of UK public goods, it would be as if Scotland 
was a separate state within the UK union. 
 
Fiscal federalism is a more subtle concept than fiscal 
autonomy. It is generally agreed that if public goods and 
services are provided and financed in the geographical 
jurisdictions that embrace the benefits and costs of their 
provision, then there will be potential gains. These gains 
are to static and dynamic economic efficiency (i.e. resource 
allocation and growth), and to political accountability and 
transparency
i
. But, crucially, some sub-national authorities 
may not have sufficient taxable resources to finance the 
provision of appropriate services (vertical imbalances) and 
taxable capacity is likely to vary across jurisdictions 
(horizontal imbalances). In these inevitable circumstances, 
proponents of fiscal decentralisation and fiscal federalism 
argue that the unity of the state requires equalisation 
payments from the centre and redistribution from 
jurisdictions with high levels of income to those with lower 
taxable capacity. 
 
Fiscal federalism therefore differs from fiscal autonomy at 
the SCG level in that under fiscal federalism inter- 
jurisdictional transfers via central government are made for 
equity (and also economic stabilisation) reasons. Under 
fiscal autonomy they are not. Further, under fiscal 
federalism the degree of decentralisation to SCGs in 
spending and tax powers can vary considerably. On the 
expenditure side, jurisdictions may have complete freedom 
to determine the allocation, or may be allowed to spend on 
a basket of goods and services subject to certain centrally 
directed standards of provision. These standards may 
effectively ring fence spending on certain areas. On 
revenues, SCG‟s autonomy may vary from the very little, 
with no own local taxation and funding provided by a grant 
from the centre, through higher degrees of local taxation 
and the sharing/assignment of tax revenues, to a high 
degree of own taxation and the devolution in part or in 
whole of rates and bases of national taxes. 
 
According to Ebel and Yilmaz (2001) fiscal decentralisation 
has the potential to improve economic efficiency through 
the promotion of allocative and managerial efficiencies. 
Better allocation results from local governments having 
better information than central government on the 
preferences of local people for specific goods and services, 
including the allocation of resources between present and 
future consumption i.e. for economic growth. In addition, 
competition between jurisdictions will increase as 
individuals migrate to those areas that best meet their 
preferences. It is argued that such competition will ensure 
the better use of public resources, limit excessive taxation 




One thing the literature on fiscal federalism fails to make 
clear is the relationship between the degree of 
decentralisation and the postulated economic benefits. 
H&M assert that “fiscal autonomy is like fiscal federalism 
but more so!” (page 2). By which they mean that economic 
incentives are even clearer under the former than the latter. 
However, they reach this conclusion by privileging 
efficiency considerations whilst marginalizing equity and 
stabilisation concerns. This drives them to an extreme 
conclusion. This is actually unusual for economists who are 
generally keen to stress the need to focus on trading off 
marginal benefits and costs. 
 
However, this would be less problematic if the theoretical 
arguments for the incentive promoting powers of fiscal 
autonomy were as strong as the rhetoric. Unfortunately 
they are not. We show in the next section that the present 
Barnett based system already exhibits many of the key 
characteristics required to encourage the efficient use of 
resources and to allow a democratically disciplined Scottish 
Parliament to make optimal allocation choices. 
 
Another related difficulty with some of the literature on 
fiscal decentralisation is a lack of clarity on the 
mechanisms that link decentralisation to improved 
economic performance. H&M‟s work seems particularly 
prone to this problem. In addition to the benefits that flow 
from a better reflection of local preferences and tax 
competition between jurisdictions, H&M take the 
reasonable view that people, including politicians, will make 




face the costs as well as enjoy the benefits of public 
expenditure (Hallwood and MacDonald, 2006, page 10). 
This is implicit in the tax competition argument for fiscal 
decentralisation, where it is assumed that people will 
migrate towards those jurisdictions that offer a given basket 
of public goods and services at a lower tax cost, or offer 
greater quality and choice at given cost. 
 
H&M take this point further and argue that greater fiscal 
responsibility implies a harder budget constraint, which will 
make political decision makers spend more wisely – more 
efficiently – to meet local preferences than in jurisdictions 
with less fiscal responsibility. However, H&M appear to 
assume (page 11) that a fiscal imbalance at the SCG level 
– funded by central government - is synonymous with the 
budget constraint facing the SCG authorities. We suggest 
that this is incorrect. 
 
Whether a budget constraint is hard or not depends on the 
mechanisms that set the budget. The fact that a SCG is 
subject, in the jargon of the literature, to a vertical 
imbalance, where its expenditure needs are greater than its 
taxable capacity, says little about the conditions that 
determine the level of expenditure incurred to meet those 
needs. Jurisdictions that have responsibility for own 
taxation and have ample taxable capacity might still be 
subject to a soft budget constraint if they are in receipt of 
central government grants, or are able to borrow 
profligately at below opportunity cost. Conversely, 
jurisdictions that have little responsibility for own taxation 
may have their expenditure limits rigorously set, which we 
argue below is the case in the UK Barnett system, and so 
are subject to a hard budget constraint. 
 
So, from the standpoint of economic efficiency, a fiscal 
system will be efficient if for changes in public spending the 
marginal social benefits and the marginal social costs are 
perceived and equated by the political authority. There 
remains some doubt that increasing levels of fiscal 
decentralisation, up to and including fiscal autonomy, are 
inherently more likely to satisfy this condition. This would 
appear especially so in a world of increasing economic 
interdependence and spillovers in and between 
jurisdictions through trade, factor and knowledge flows. In 
such a world, the need for central government to apply tax 
and subsidy policy differentially across jurisdictions to 
internalise such externalities would appear to be more 
pressing. 
 
3.  The Barnett system and fiscal autonomy 
H&M are particularly disparaging about the present Barnett 
based system for financing the Scottish Parliament We 
take a much more sanguine view. Table 1 compares some 
of the key characteristics of the present (Barnett) 
mechanism with those of full fiscal autonomy. The 
characteristics reflect, in the context of the UK, the desired 
properties of an efficient and effective fiscal system at the 
SCG level. 









1.  Hard budget 
constraint 
+ + 
2.  Composition of public 
spending 
+ + 
3.  Private/Public sector 
split 
+ + 
4. Scottish growth 
incentive 
- + 
5.  Choice of tax mix - + 
6.  Westminster incentive + - 
7.  Democratic 
accountability 
+ + 
8.  Automatic 
stabilisation 
+ - 







Characteristics 1 to 6 embrace economic efficiency and 
growth issues, characteristics 7, 8 and 9 refer to 
democratic accountability, stabilisation and equalisation, 
respectively. A plus sign indicates that the characteristic is 
present while a minus sign suggests the opposite. No 
attempt is made in the table to indicate the degree or 
extent to which each characteristic is present in each 
system. However, this is considered in the discussion 
below. We deal with each characteristic in turn. 
 
Hard budget constraint 
H&M attach extra-ordinary importance to public sector 
decision makers having a “hard” budget constraint. H&M 
(p. 11) put it this way: “If a region knows that the size of the 
bloc grant it receives is [positively] related to the size of its 
fiscal imbalances [the difference between the local public 
expenditure and the local tax take], the incentive to reduce 
its fiscal imbalance is compromised: the region in effect 
faces a soft budget constraint.” The essence seems to be 
that where devolved decision makers know that they have 
to live with their mistakes, they will make better decisions. 
A hard budget constraint implies no ex post bail out from 
central government. 
 
H&M believe that fiscal autonomy gives the hardest budget 
constraint. However, the formal system for allocating 
funding to the Scottish Parliament, the Barnett formula, 
also provides a hard budget constraint. The system of 
funding to the Scottish Parliament produces incremental 
financial allocations that are driven by a formula based 
upon Scotland‟s population share within the UK. This is 
unrelated to the size of the fiscal balance. Formula bypass 
may still occur, as was the case with Treasury funding of 
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the debt write-off in the Glasgow housing stock transfer, 
but it is transparent and relatively rare. In addition, the 
Scottish Parliament and its Executive have no borrowing 
powers. Conversely, under fiscal autonomy while spending 
is limited by own taxation H&M allow scope for borrowing. 
There would appear to be little between the two systems in 
the hardness of the budget constraint. 
 
H&M‟s lack of understanding of the present funding system 
for Scotland is revealed (page 12) when in support of their 
view that the budget constraint presently is soft, they 
suggest that poor Scottish standards of health may be 
used as an argument for a larger grant from Westminster. 
The Barnett formula does not work in this way. There is no 
moral hazard: Scotland does not get more funding if it has 
poor health. It is incorrect to suggest that the Scottish 
Executive is a „Leviathan‟ government intent on expanding 
its budget with no incentive to improve the health of the 
Scottish people. The recent legislation banning smoking in 
pubs, restaurants and other public places would appear to 
give the lie to that contention. 
 
Composition of public spending 
H&M suggest (page 14) that a key argument in favour of 
fiscal federalism is that it improves the use of resources 
both in a static - allocative efficiency – and dynamic – 
growth – framework. Scottish Parliament politicians would 
be encouraged to better reflect the Scottish people‟s 
preferences on education, innovation, private capital and 
infrastructure, which could have an important influence on 
growth. H&M make the argument in terms of fiscal 
federalism, so it cannot be construed as an argument for 
fiscal autonomy per se. It should be clear that the allocation 
of spending has little to do with how the funding is raised or 
collected. The arrangements for funding the Scottish 
Parliament as determined by the Scotland Act (1998) allow 
no constraint to be placed on the composition of public 
spending outside the areas of defence, foreign affairs, 
social protection and certain regulations that are reserved 
to Westminster. As the Steel Commission (2006) notes: 
 
“ …the Scottish Parliament has very significant autonomy 
and discretion because of the fact that the block grant 
system does not ring-fence spending areas. In comparison 
with most other federal or quasi-federal systems, the extent 
of real power over policy and decision-making is 
considerable” (page 85). 
 
And the parliament is accountable for these spending 
decisions through the normal democratic process, which 
will ensure in the long-term at least that the preferences of 
the Scottish people are respected. 
 
Private/public sector split 
H&M argue (page 8) that the present funding arrangements 
give the Scottish Executive and parliament little incentive to 
choose the correct balance between the size of the public 
and private sectors. H&M err in implying that there is some 
optimal size for the public sector in an absolute sense: it is 
a decision that should be taken at the margin and should 
depend on the extent of market failure, the efficiency and 
effectiveness of delivery mechanisms e.g. the adoption of 
contestability and choice mechanisms as opposed to target 
setting and monopoly supply (Crafts 2005), the efficiency of 
regulation etc. as well as public preferences, all of which 
affect the social benefit from public spending. 
 
H&M would be correct in arguing that the incentives to 
reduce the size, and/or increase the efficiency, of the public 
sector may be less under the present system than under 
fiscal autonomy. Under fiscal autonomy a marginal tax rule 
effectively operates where an extra pound of public 
spending has to be funded by an extra pound of taxation – 
in the long run if a borrowing facility is allowed. So, the 
optimal size of public sector provision would be determined 
at the point where the marginal benefits of an extra pound 
of public spending equal the marginal tax cost. 
 
Yet under the present system a constrained version of the 
marginal tax rule is possible through variations in the tartan 
tax. The Scottish Parliament can increase or decrease its 
budget through increasing or decreasing the standard rate 
of income tax. H&M (p. 26) do acknowledge this but simply 
state that “the amount of variation is not great”. However, 
the point is that variation at the margin is possible. H&M do 
not appear to have an answer to the question that if the 
size of the public sector is an important issue for the 
Scottish electorate – in whose intelligence they claim to 
place great faith (page 3) – then why have voters not 
forced the parliament to use the tartan tax one way or the 
other? 
 
Scottish growth incentive 
Fiscal federalism according to H&M (pages 14, 15) would 
provide a much stronger incentive for the Scottish 
executive to adopt policies to raise economic growth than 
the present funding arrangements where the extra tax take 
from improved growth flows to the UK Treasury. On the 
face of it this argument is correct. However, we offer some 
caveats. First, it is not clear that fiscal autonomy offers a 
much greater incentive than fiscal federal arrangements of 
assigned tax revenues or the ability to lower or vary tax 
rates and bases. Secondly, it is an assumption that the 
return of higher tax revenues will provide an incentive to 
Scottish politicians to promote growth. This is almost 
tantamount to assuming a „Leviathan‟ government where 
the pursuit of higher revenues and expenditure is 
paramount. It is not clear that the Scottish Executive would 
behave in this way and the empirical evidence supporting 
the Leviathan hypothesis is not at all conclusive (Ebel and 
Yilmaz, 2001). One of the key arguments favouring fiscal 
decentralisation is that it enables a SCG to better reflect 
local preferences. The present Scottish devolution 
settlement also has this property and if the Scottish 
electorate desires higher growth it should be expected that 
the Scottish parliament would respond to it. Thirdly, this 
argument suggests that local politicians are forward looking 
and have low time discount rates: not a characteristic 




normally associated with the practice of politics. Fourth, 
H&M now assert that the empirical evidence indicates that 
increased fiscal decentralisation is favourable to economic 
growth. They did not adopt such a straightforward view in 
their previous work.  And as the Steel Commission (2006) 
points out “the evidence on the link between fiscal 
decentralisation and economic growth is … (hard) … to 
come by with relatively little research having been 
conducted” (page 38). 
 
Choice of tax mix 
The present funding arrangements severely constrain the 
Scottish people from choosing their preferred mix of taxes. 
Some scope is present through the ability to alter the tartan 
and council taxes, but it is clear that fiscal autonomy offers 
the most scope to meet such preferences. However, it is 
unclear how important such an issue is with the Scottish 
electorate and it is a moot point whether a different tax mix 
from the present UK would be more economically efficient. 
 
Westminster incentive 
The present system provides an incentive to Westminster 
to watch what is going on in Scotland and monitor the 
impact that Scottish policies may have on the UK as well 
as the impact of UK policies on Scotland. Spatial spillovers 
are important within an integrated economy (McGregor and 
Swales, 2005) suggesting a need for co-ordination, the 




Under the present Scottish devolution arrangements the 
parliament is accountable for the allocation of public 
expenditure and, given the tartan tax, the absolute size of 
the budget to be spent at the margin. An argument cannot 
be sustained that Scottish politicians are less 
democratically accountable under the present system than 




The adoption of fiscal autonomy would remove most of the 
stabilisation benefits that accrue to participation in the UK 
tax and benefits system: increased social protection 
payments, and reduced income tax and corporation tax 
outlays. It is true that a fiscally autonomous Scotland with 
borrowing rights would be able to increase its fiscal deficit 
in the face of an exogenous shock. However, the scope for 
this is likely to be severely limited since a binding 
borrowing constraint is likely to be imposed for UK macro- 
stabilisation reasons. Under fiscal autonomy the risk of 
greater cyclical instability would probably increase, with all 
the implications that would have for investment and forward 
planning. 
 
UK spatial distribution 
The adoption of fiscal autonomy would also remove from 
Scotland the equalisation payments that are found to be 
part of both unitary and most federal systems. In the 
absence of greater tax revenues, current needs could only 
be met by higher tax rates or would fail to be met through 
public expenditure having to be lower. H&M recognise this 
(page 26) but imply that Scottish oil revenues may be 
sufficient to substitute – which ignores one of the rules of 
fiscal federalist theory that natural resource taxation should 
not be devolved due to price, and hence tax revenue, 
variability. However, if oil revenues were returned to 
Scotland it would be a foolhardy government that based 
long-term public expenditure plans on such variable 
revenues. 
 
H&M contend that even if equity transfers were reduced 
under fiscal autonomy the faster economic growth resulting 
from fiscal autonomy would provide the tax revenue to fill 
the gap (pages 26 and 27). But as we have noted the 
evidence does not allow us to be so sanguine about the 
link between fiscal decentralisation, never mind fiscal 
autonomy, and economic growth. 
 
4. Uncertain issues for full fiscal autonomy 
In their paper, H&M stress that they are arguing for the 
economics of fiscal autonomy. They refer to the Steel 
Commission as being “largely driven by political 
considerations” (p.2) and assert that “[t]he politics of the 
Scotland Act (1998) has gotten in the way of sensible 
economics” (p.8). However, we believe that H&M‟s 
argument cannot abstract economic theory from the 
political reality in which their proposals must operate and 
that the resolution of a number of issues is crucial to the 
functioning of any alternative fiscal system. We look in turn 
at issues surrounding Scotland‟s resource transfer to the 
United Kingdom for those public or merit goods that remain 
UK-wide, how issues of national debt repayment and debt 
issue may prove awkward to resolve and whether the 
proposals offer any solution to the West Lothian Question. 
 
H&M propose sufficient fiscal control to SCG that the 
United Kingdom government would find itself in a deficit 
position relative to its own revenue generation and 
expenditure responsibilities for Scotland (they do not 
comment on the economic inefficiency this would create at 
the United Kingdom level while they seek to solve the 
same concern in Scotland‟s present fiscal position). They 
suggest that Scotland would make transfers to 
Westminster to pay for the services provided for the whole 
of the United Kingdom, presumably defence, foreign and 
diplomatic affairs and immigration. They do not provide any 
indication as to how this may be done. 
 
There is a historical precedent within the United Kingdom 
of SCG being given authority to raise the majority of 
taxation and subsequently make transfer payments to 
Westminster: that of Northern Ireland between 1920 and 
1972. The terms of the Government of Ireland Act 1920 
envisioned the Stormont government running a budget 
surplus sufficient to make what was termed an “Imperial 
Contribution” for the services provided for its benefit by 
Westminster and for its share of the costs in managing the 
   
 
 
Empire. Mitchell (2006) provides an acute analysis of the 
failure of the system and the quick transfer of the Imperial 
Contribution into an effective Imperial subsidy. While the 
time and circumstances may have been different many of 
the failures of the system remain pertinent. 
 
Northern Ireland faced the problem of simply being unable 
to afford a United Kingdom standard of public expenditure 
given its own fiscal capacity. The Westminster government 
could not permit large out-migration flows and sought to 
subsidise Northern Ireland to prevent this. While the 
problem is not so acute for Scotland, the fact remains that 
even with all North Sea Oil receipts Scotland is reckoned to 
be in a persistent deficit position (Scottish Executive, 
various). Fiscal autonomy must concern itself not with what 





An Imperial Exchequer Board was established to determine 
the level of contribution expected of Northern Ireland on the 
basis of its revenues and the services it received. A similar 
body would be required to regulate the financial relations 
between a fiscally autonomous Scotland and the United 
Kingdom. This would need to consist of representatives of 
both governments and have terms of reference in case of 
disputes, such as may occur over the increased, and 
probably unforeseen, defence requirements that the United 
Kingdom government may be required to undertake. An 
issue in such cases is likely to be whether the new body 
would have first call on financial resources. Mechanisms 
can be established to resolve these issues, but they are 
part of the fiscal package and cannot be dismissed as 
political considerations. 
 
H&M envisage Scotland being granted borrowing powers. 
This raises the problem of how to treat existing as opposed 
to future national debt. Again Ireland provides an example. 
The constitution of the Irish Free State stipulated that it was 
required to service the debt of the United Kingdom. In fact 
this did not happen and when the Republic of Ireland was 
established it did not inherit any share of the existing 
United Kingdom debt. It is unlikely Scotland would be 
permitted such an outcome. Instead, a division would 
require to be made between that debt incurred for the 
benefit of the United Kingdom prior to fiscal autonomy and 
subsequently that debt incurred by the Scottish 
government for Scotland‟s benefit and that incurred for the 
United Kingdom on those services provided for the whole 
of the United Kingdom (including Scotland). This is no easy 
task. 
 
At present the United Kingdom does not borrow for specific 
purposes – it has a general borrowing requirement that it 
meets through lending markets and a large part of 
borrowing is recycled as debt is repaid and re-issued. 
Another body would need to be established to address 
these issues and to determine what share of whole United 
Kingdom existing debt servicing Scotland should incur and 
subsequently what share of post-fiscal autonomy whole 
United Kingdom debt servicing is due to Scotland. 
 
A final issue is whether fiscal autonomy offers any potential 
solution to the West Lothian Question. Put simply, this is 
the anomaly that Scottish MPs may vote on all matters 
affecting England while English MPs at Westminster can 
vote only on those matters affecting Scotland that are not 
devolved to the Scottish Parliament. H&M propose the 
devolution of almost all taxation to Edinburgh. If additional 
responsibilities currently held at Westminster do not follow 
the change in fiscal responsibility to Edinburgh, then there 
will remain a large vertical fiscal imbalance: Scotland‟s 
taxation receipts in 2003-04 were estimated at £34bns 
while total government expenditure in Scotland is 
estimated at £45.3bns. Of that, spending by the Executive 
amounted to £23.5bns with the remaining £20bns being 
spent by the United Kingdom government 
between reserved matters in Scotland and Scotland's 
share of expenditure incurred for the benefit of the whole of 
the United Kingdom. An outcome without further devolution 
of powers from London to Edinburgh would put great 
pressure on inter-governmental transfers and the body 
required to oversee them. 
 
If anything H&M‟s proposals are likely to increase the 
pressure on Scottish MPs at Westminster. Should greater 
devolution of powers than currently granted under the 
Scotland Act be considered as a part of the plans for fiscal 
autonomy laid out by H&M, then the scope for Scotland‟s 
MPs to vote on matters affecting Scotland would be 
reduced to the limited remnants of whole-UK functions. 
However, there is no method at present to restrict those 
issues on which Scottish MPs may vote and without a 
radical change in the procedures of the House of 
Commons Westminster could have less influence on the 
lives of those living in Scotland while the role of its 
representatives is unchanged. Sufficient changes in fiscal 
structure can demand institutional alteration and there can 
be little doubt that fiscal autonomy would require a radical 
recasting of the role of Scotland‟s representatives at 
Westminster, with the impacts we have discussed above 
as the „Westminster incentive‟. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we have argued that Hallwood and 
MacDonald (2006) while purporting to establish a case for 
fiscal autonomy in Scotland have signally failed to do so. 
The arguments deployed in their previous work in favour of 
a form of fiscal federalism in Scotland do not, as they 
suggest, have even greater force in the case for fiscal 
autonomy within the Union. They do not appear to 
appreciate fully the problems that would arise from the 
adoption of such a system, nor do they appear to be fully 
aware of the properties of the present form of funding 
devolution under the Barnett based system. 
 
We contend that in adopting fiscal autonomy Scotland 
would lose many of the benefits of economic and fiscal 




integration with the rest of the UK for little or no gain 
compared with a form of fiscal federalism or the present 
Barnett system. It is, therefore, not surprising that Hallwood 
and MacDonald (2004 and 2005) in their earlier work could 
not identify one example of an advanced federal or 
devolved country that had opted for fiscal autonomy at the 
Steel Commission (2006) “Moving to Federalism – A New 
Settlement for Scotland”, Edinburgh. 
sub-central government (SCG) level. But, in view of this, it    
is surprising that H&M now cease to reject full fiscal 
autonomy for Scotland and embrace it with enthusiasm. 
The Steel Commission (2006) concludes that 
 
“… full fiscal autonomy is not in the interests of Scotland – 
in fact it would be extremely damaging to Scotland. It also 
ignores the considerable benefits, both to Scotland and the 
rest of Britain, of being part of the United Kingdom. It exists 
in no other industrialised country in the world and it is clear 
that such a system effectively negates any meaningful role 
for a wider UK state” (page 91). 
 
Our analysis supports that conclusion. 
Endnotes: 
i
It is assumed that central government can only provide 
public goods and services uniformly across jurisdictions 
(Ebel and Yilmaz (2001)). 
 
ii 
Although the degree of competition under the limited and 
asymmetrically devolved UK system is small. 
 
iii 
This raises the question of whether H&M see fiscal 
autonomy as a general financing mechanism for all the 
devolved administrations and what the response would be 
for fiscal autonomy for London, for example.
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